UNITED the major challenges facing most

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION AND THE POLITICS OF ANTI-CORRUPTION IN NIGERIABYONI OLUWATIMILEHIN SEUN08165771794ADP15/16/H/6009BEING A PRE-FIELD SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED TO DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATION, OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY, ILE-IFE.

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M. Sc.) DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.SUPERVISOR:Prof. C. UKEJE2018CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION1.

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1 Background To The StudyThe history of corruption is as old as the history of the world. The phenomenon has been endemic, and ubiquitous, in the public and private spheres, but not peculiar to any continent or country. One of the major challenges facing most developing countries in the Global South,including Nigeria, is that corruption has become a persistent bane since most of them gained independence, and despite attempts by successive governments to curtail the menace (Awoshakin, 2006, Uji, 2015). According to the International Monetary Fund, “approximately 2% of the world’s gross domestic product, GDP, estimated at up to US$1.8 trillion, is laundered on a yearly basis” also, “a significant portion of that activity involves funds derived from corruption.” There is therefore an urgent imperative to cooperate at the multilateral (international) level to combat corruption (IMF, 2001) given especially that countries acting alone cannot fully tackle the problem. For Nigeria, the most populous and one of the minerals-rich countries in Africa, one of the perennial challenges that continues to stall the socio-economic, political and religious evolution in the country is linked to the menace of corruption According to the former Chair of the anti-corruption agency, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria is estimated to have lost US$380billion between 1960 in independence and 1999 when the military government handed over power to civilian administration. In recent times, the scale has increased as there is virtually no day that the newspapers and the courts are not flooded with cases of corruption, mostly involving high-profile government officials across the three divisions of government namely federal, state and local government.

Even though the press have succeed in putting a number of these high profile corruption opprobrium on the spotlight, there is still very little done to explore the local and international dynamics that drive and allow corruption to fester, or even the impacts of corruption on the country in the medium and long terms (PWC, 2016).At her assumption of duty from her position as Director at the World Bank, Mrs Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, a former Minister of Finance, was quoted as saying “Nigeria has become virtually synonymous with the word corruption” (Iweala, 2014: 81). This opinion was reiterated by her principal, former President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who insisted: “The truth is that, it is much tougher to fight corruption in a developing society than it is in the developed world” (Obasanjo, 2003). According to Brunelle-Quraishi, (2011), “out of an estimated $400 billion that has been looted from the African continent, about a quarter originates from Nigeria; a country where a majority of its population live on less than a dollar a day”.The menace of corruption is felt throughout the Nigerian economy, in government as well as within the private sector. Citizens have identified corruption as the reason behind the deplorable state of Nigeria’s economy such that despite being seen as the giant of Africa, it continues to experience poor growth, economic crisis and development in many sectors (Okoduwa, 2008:6).

In 2004, Nigeria was ranked the second most corrupt nation in the world on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International (TI), and during the following year, was ranked 13th out of 146 countries. In 2007, Nigeria was also ranked the 32nd most corrupt nation of the world but this did not mean significant improvement in the country’s fight against corruption as Nigeria was ranked 17th most corrupt nation the subsequent year. (Ukiro 2008: 4). Successive civilian administrations since 1999 have prioritised the fight against corruption as a major agenda. When incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari, assumed office in May 2015, his administration placed premium on the anti-corruption drive as a key policy pillar and in fulfilment of his campaign promises. Despite public criticisms of the current administration, including strong ones such as bias and weak prosecution, the EFCC has taken on a number of high-profile cases under the administration; including putting in place the whistle blower policy to encourage citizen’s report on corruption cases. In this essay, the focus is on how global regimes put established under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) might help the on-going fight against corruption in Nigeria, and elsewhere around the world.

The UNCAC is a multilateral initiative negotiated by member-states of the United Nations as the first global, and legally binding, international anti-corruption instrument. The Convention contains 71 Articles which are tiered into 8 Chapters which was incorporated by the United Nations General Assembly in October 2003 with a Secretariat that is based in Vienna, Austria. The UNCAC is a remarkable achievement in international cooperation against corruption and a transnational response to a transnational challenge.

To date, 145 nations of the world have signed the Convention and are bound by its provisions, making it one of the revolutionary multilateral initiatives for asset recovery in the field of international law.Nigeria became a signatory the UNCAC on the 9th of December 2003, formalising it less than one year later, on 24th October 2004. Before the ratification of the UNCAC, several legislative and administrative attempts have been made by the government to implement key provisions, including measures to prevent and punish corruption by establishing new institutions or strengthening existing ones. Further, new enabling laws have either been promulgated, or existing ones revised to ensure that legal and administrative measures against corruption are best on global norms in the eradication of corruption. In Nigeria, “the major anticorruption institutions includes; the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission-(EFCC), The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Bureau of Public procurement (BPP), The Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI),The Public Complaints Commission (PCC), The Office of the Auditor-General of the Federation, and the Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR)” (IFRD, 2016:10).

Despite the plethora of institutions, however, measures to fight corruption seem too weak to defeat corruption in Nigeria. The present study focuses on how the external environment helps or undermines the quest to fight corruption in Nigeria.1.2 Statement of ProblemCorruption has slowed down the pace of development in Nigeria and, for the most part, its adverse effects on national development has been phenomenal (Steteolu, 2004). The history of corruption in Nigeria can be dated to 1960’s when Nigeria gained independence. From that time onwards, the nation’s treasury has been ravaged by “accounts of misappropriation of funds, embezzlement or looting of treasury, prebendalism and settlements through grafts and contracts” (Awoshakin, 2006:46). With hindsight, a major reason for the January 15, 1966 military coup d’état was the allegation of “crass materialism among government ministers and corruption in high places”.

(Iyayi, 2004:10) According to Major General Kaduna Nzeogwu, the state “enemies were those political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent”. In his words, they have “put Nigeria’s political calendar backwards” (Vaguard Newspaper, 2010)This situation has, over the years, given Nigeria an embarrassing name in the international arena, making the country to feature in world news mostly for the wrong reasons. Several attempts have been made by past governments to fight corruption. From War Against Indiscipline (WAI) undertaken by the Buhari-Idiagbon military regime in the 1980s to the War Against Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC) by the Abacha regime in the 1990s, the National Orientation Movement and the Mass Mobilization for Social Justice by Babangida regime between 1986 and 1987. Further, the return to civilian democracy in 1999, Nigeria has intensified the fight against corruption through a number of Anti-corruption policies, including The Money Laundering Act in 2000 by the Obasanjo administration (PWC 2016).In a bid to scale up the national anti-corruption framework, Nigeria formalised the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2003. With this, the country became obligated to implement as well as domesticate the provisions of the Conventions into municipal law and step-up the fight against corruption.

Furthermore, Nigeria enacted “the Criminal Code, Criminal Law 2011, Penal Code, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Establishment Act (2004), and the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act of 2004″ (Chukwuemerie, 2006: 178) (Mohammed, 2013:124). Despite these anti-corruption initiatives and bodies, Nigeria’s fight against corruption faces major implementation challenges” (Mohammed, 2013:125). This is because it still fails to criminalise bribery involving only private sector actors. There are also concerns as to the criminalisation of the offences of bribery of foreign public officials and the offence of illicit enrichment.Although the establishment of the ICPC and the EFCC is commendable, Nigeria appears to have taken levity some of the provisions of the UNCAC. These provisions include Article 6(2) of the Convention requiring each state party to, inter alia, grant the anti-graft agencies full autonomy and to ensure that they are adequately resourced to carry out their functions effectively. The independence of agencies like the ICPC and EFCC is negated by the appointment and removal of the heads of the ICPC or EFCC by the President of Nigeria subject to the confirmation of the Senate. Such senatorial confirmation serves to secure the tenure of the head and members by the President incapacitates the anti-corruption agencies from capriciously appointing or removing a member without the concurrence of the Senate.

There is no doubt that the effectiveness of any framework for fighting corruption would depend largely on the political context in any country in terms of the willingness of the government to uphold anti-corruption provisions, provide secured funding to relevant agencies and allow such agencies to maintain full autonomy and transparency. If these conditions are not met, the framework will crumble.This study therefore seeks to evaluate the fight against corruption in Nigeria within the framework of United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC); examine the factors militating against the effectiveness and implementations of the provisions of the UNCAC; and propose alternative futures in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.

In terms of specific questions, the study will evaluate how well Nigeria has been able to implement the provisions of the UNCAC in her fight against corruption and the feasibility of the UNCAC’s provisions in combating corruption in Nigeria.1.3. Objectives of the StudyThe broad objective of this study is to examine the role of UNCAC in the global and national efforts to fight corruption. The specific objectives are also as follows:1) To examine the acts and practices of corruption as set out under the UNCAC vis-à-vis the establishment and activities of anti-corruption agencies such as The EFCC and ICPC in Nigeria.2) To determine the extent that Nigeria has mainstreamed and complied with the provisions of UNCAC.3) To examine the UNCAC role in fighting corruption in Nigeria4) To identify factors militating against Nigeria’s implementation of the UNCAC provision against corruption.

1.4. Research QuestionsI. What is the role of UNCAC in the global fight against corruption?II. To what extent has the provisions of the UNCAC influenced or shaped the Nigeria’s fight against corruption in Nigeria?III. To what extent has Nigeria been able to implement the provisions of the UNCAC in its fight against corruption?IV. What are the issues, problems or challenges militating against Nigeria’s anticorruption campaign?1.5 HypothesesI.

Ha: The provisions of UNCAC have no relevance in the fight against corruption in Nigeria.II. Ha: There is no significant relationship between the provisions of UNCAC and the works of the Nigerian anti-graft agencies.1.6. Significances of the StudyThis study is a major contribution to understanding the basis for the success or failures of the anti-corruption campaign by successive administrations since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999. While there substantial attention to the campaign in the literatures (EXAMPLES), the present study brings in the often missed international dimensions to the campaign; arguing that such dimensions are necessary in order to properly and adequately understand the limitations and opportunities associated with the fight against corruption in Nigeria. This study therefore, represents a contribution to the search for creative solutions to the menace of corruption in Nigeria in that it seeks to identify and highlight the role of divergent constituencies, national and external, in the fight against corruption within the framework of UNCAC.

By incorporating how, and to what extent, Nigeria might benefit for complementing current national efforts with strict adherence to international regimes such as UNCAC, the present study hopes to shed light on the complementary role that the agency of the external- as represented by the UNCAC- could play in boosting on-going efforts to address corruption and tackle its multiplier effects for Nigeria.1.7. Scope of the StudyThere is no doubt that the UNCAC is a remarkable achievement in the global campaign against corruption. The Convention provides, for example, the basis for an embodiment of regulations, guidelines, standards, measures and rules, affording member countries to strengthen their legal and regulatory regimes to fight corruption. The convention made provision for the outlawing of the most ubiquitous forms of corruption at the municipal or private sector. One major achievement of the convention is in the area of assets recovery.

Member states are required to repatriate stolen assets gotten through corrupt means back to the state which it was acquired. From this convention arises the blueprint and strategy developed to form the ICPC and the EFCC in Nigeria. This thesis therefore covers the period since from 1999 when Nigeria made a transition from military to civilian rule until 2017.

In that period, a number of key milestones were scored not just in terms of the political development of the country, in general, but also in the fight against corruption, in particular. Some of the key milestones are as follows: (1) From 1999 to date, Nigeria has witnessed four continuous and back-to-back multiparty civilian rule;(2) Each of the civilian administrations have recognised and prioritised the fight against corruption as key policy cornerstones;(3) The period has witnessed the promulgation of a multiplicity of legislations as well as the establishment of agencies to tackle corruption;(4) The records of the different civilian administrations in the fight against corruption has been varied, making it possible to evaluate one against the other; and finally(5) Despite the plethora of anti-corruption legislations and agencies, the rate and incidences of corruption has not abated as evident in the number of high profile corruption charges in court and in the newspapers. BibliographyU4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center. (2010). UNCAC in a nutshell: A quick guide to the United Nations Covention Against Corruption for embassy and donor agency staff.

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1 Conceptual Review2.1.1 CorruptionThe World Bank (1997:9) defined corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gains.” This definition sees corruption in the context of the public sphere when a public official misuses office by collecting or extorting monetary or non-monetary benefits from an individual or group in return for favours, again in cash or kind, to bend or bypass established policies. For the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, corruption is similarly defined in terms of the “misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement” (2004:9).

What is significant about these definitions is that they reinforce the notion that corruption could be an issue in a state-society relations but one that also requires the decisive role of both spheres to tackle. They also imply that the genesis of corruption is traceable to the two realms, and the social interactions within and beyond its remit. At the domestic level, for instance, corruption operates across different “branches of the state as well as between political and bureaucratic institutions” (Amundsen, 1994: 4). It is generally linked with how the activities of the government, especially those that involve the exercise of monopolistic and discretionary powers are carried out without transparency and accountability. Invariably, the larger the size and writ of government especially in the allocation of state resources and privileges, the more fertile the conditions for corruption to thrive (Tanzi, 1998: 566)At the conceptual level, therefore, corruption as a social phenomenon may not have a generally accepted definition. The absence of consensus on what corruption means has, in turn, led to a lot of misconceptions regarding how it is incubated and reproduced, or how even how it might be tackled. Munyae ; Lesetedi asserts that the relativity of the concept “makes it difficult to coin a single and widely accepted definition of corruption as it means different things to different people or society and it varies from one place to another” (Lesetedi et al, 2002: 52).

Furthermore, the complexity of the phenomenon in terms of causes, effects and manifestations in various contexts make it rather difficult to find a widely acceptable definition among social scientists (Andvig et al, 2000:10) or even to identify the true nature and extent of crises associated to corruption (Tanzi, 1998:564). Because it is difficult to subject corruption to a one-size-fits-all definition, Robert Williams argued that it “resists simple definition because it is not a discrete phenomenon, separate and distinct from all other forms of political and administrative behaviour” (Williams, 1987: 27-28). What cannot be disputed, however, is that corruption is not new but a phenomenon that is as old as modern civilisation and deeply embedded in the human nature characterised by egoism and obsessive quest for acquisitions (Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001:7) It is also important to underscore the point that corruption is not limited to a state, a race or a period of time, but can be found in all systems of government and societies across the world. Scott (1972: 3) asserts that corruption “must be understood as a regular, repetitive and integral part of the operation of most political systems.” Aluko (2009: 2) also further argues that corruption is not limited to any nation but a “global phenomenon and not the exclusive preserve of any nation, race or section of the world”. As Gould and Kold (1964:143) rightly noted, “corruption is rife in both authoritarian and multiparty democratic systems of government”. This is to say beyond doubts that corruption affects non-democratic regimes or governments and does not leave out established democracies including those in the west.

There is a tendency, especially in the West, to view, associate or even elevate corruption to a “culture” that is solely a bane of non-Western societies in the developing world. For example, (Waliggo, 2003:117) argues that “corruption like most myth is an African culture because it is expected that a beneficiary should show appreciation for a service rendered by another”. For example, a contract seeker must show gratitude and appreciation either in kind or in cash. Failure to do this will either lead to forfeiture of future awards or frustration of the current job. As Stanley (2005:34) puts it, “corruption is a myth because in one culture bribery is corruption whereas in another it is an expression of mutual goodwill”.

“Those engaged in grand corruption are embedded in a cultural space where corruption is part of the background expectance of holding public office” (Momoh and Okojie, 2007: 112). In the words of (Englebert 1997: 767), “corruption is sometimes viewed as an element rooted in the tradition and culture of African Society”; the same point that Tignor (1993:177) made when he argues that corruption was already existent in Nigeria even before colonialism such that the colonial powers were more concerned about “good government worries about corruption and the need to provide good government” this he regarded as the rationale for colonial rule in Nigeria. Contrary to these perspectives, corruption is not peculiar to Africa and it is dangerous to categorise it as such. Robb (1992:114), for instance, argues that “the industrial revolution gave birth to a complex economy characterised by increasing dependence on finance and investment together with an increase of professionals such as lawyers and financiers that facilitated the expansion and potential for white collar crime”. Corruption happens anywhere there is the right mix of opportunity and inclination; where those with power and influence can take advantage of others for selfish interests. Even though African corruption remains pervasive and among the world’s most severe, corruption is not unique to Africa (Lawson, 2009:83).The notion of corruption being a myth of the Africans has understandably attracted considerable rebuttals from scholars, African and non-African, who critique the attempt to essentialise it as an African phenomenon. This is a bogus claim given that the pre-colonial and present African society “clearly frowns at” corruption, or stealing of anything that does not legally belong to an individual.

According to Maduagwu (2005), non-conformity with these sacrosanct norms would typically attract opprobrium and punishment through well-established communal disciplinary action or sanction. He further argues that “it is mere trivialisation of the serious issue of corruption in the modern society for anyone to suggest that corruption or embezzlement of public funds or extortion of money (bribes) from people looking for jobs or contracts or other benefits from government could be equated to the customary requirement of bringing presents to the chief for permission to cultivate a land and such thing” (Maduagwu, 2005: 10). Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria, was also critical of the tendency to essentialize corruption in, and to, Africa when he stated that “I shudder at how an integral part of our culture could be taken as the basis for rationalising otherwise despicable behaviour” (Obasanjo, 2003: 1).2.2 Empirical ReviewOne of the formidable criticisms of the view that corruption and other social banes are patently African was offered by Peter Ekeh in his seminal work on colonialism and the two publics in Africa (1975). According to him, the colonial experience in Africa created a binary of two publics, the private and the public, whose dialectical relationships are at the roots of many of the African problems, including corruption, past and present.

Although the two publics share a lot in common, the private realm differs from the public realm in a number of salient ways. For instance, at one level is the primordial realm which is identified by morality and sentiments while the civic public is operated or dominated by civil servants, police, military, the judiciary and correctional services. For him, (1975: 91) the latter space is “amoral and lack the generalised imperatives operating in the private and primordial realm.” Paradoxically, as Ekeh further notes, the type of dialectical relationship between these two publics also characterises and shapes, for good or bad, African politics (Ekeh, 1975:92).Because the civic public is amoral, there is a great emphasis on economic values as many of those in the primordial sphere seek to gain access into the civic public. In the African public realm, an individual’s association with the civic public is judged based on economic interests. To simplify this statement is to say that an individual straddling the two publics is deemed lucky when he/she is able to channel all his luck from the civil sphere into his private.

This is the dialectical relationship between the civic public and the primordial public one in which the “unwritten law of the dialectics is that it is legitimate to rob the civil public in order to strengthen the primordial public” (Ekeh, 1975:92). The kind of dialectical relationship that exists between the two public, in the immediate and long terms, endorses or validates corruption in its various forms and shapes. At the peak of the dialectics of colonial and postcolonial societies that Ekeh aptly describes is corruption; be it the type that involves the embezzlement of funds within the civic space or the solicitation and acceptance of bribes from individuals seeking services provided within the civic public (Ekeh, 1975: 92).It is instructive the point by Ekeh that the logic that drives the primordial public is not one that is based or determined by the quest for financial rewards. Instead, for him, it is only a means to gain respect and security unlike the civic public which is for economic gains and which one is not obliged to give back and as such morality is not given much cognisance. According to (Ekeh, 1975: 92), Nigerian educated elites are of the two publics.

In His argument; the educated elites use the civic public for economic gains in a bid to please their community. This activity helps them to promote their primordial public. In turn, corruption becomes legitimised. The African politician works hard to promote more of their primordial public and less of their civic public. By so doing, African politics is crippled and corruption is legitimised. This dialecticism explicitly explains why Nigerians work hard and honestly when they are working on something they have close affinity with (Primordial Public) but otherwise when they are working on issues they have no personal affinity with (Civic public). In succinct terms a person who works with an ethnic association or clan will work with utmost discretion and sincerity but will be lethargic in work and also embezzle funds when they are doing government or public jobs.

Likewise since the Nigerian bourgeoisie is in both publics, he is quickly defended by a chieftain or his community when he has stolen public funds. This has led to the wide spreading of corruption in the public sector and many large organisations that have no primordial basis. With the benefit of hindsight, corruption seems to have taught Nigerians the dangerous, and wrong, lesson that it does not pay to be honest, hardworking and law-abiding. Through corrupt means, many political office holders acquire wealth and properties in and outside Nigeria and generally display a lifestyle well above their legitimate incomes, sometimes with the tacit acquiescence of society which gives them special recognition despite widespread knowledge about their deeds. It is partly for this reason that politics has become such a big business in Nigeria, because anything spent to secure a political office is regarded as an investment which matures immediately one gets into office (Coker, 2006).

Corruption is a process of acquiring wealth, or power, through illegal means for private gain at public expense, or the misuse of public power for private benefit (Lipset and Lenz, 2000). It is in this regard that Osoba (1996: 372) defined corruption as an anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms in ways that undermine the capacity to improve the living conditions of the people. The World Bank (1997) also defines corruption as “The abuse of public office for private gains,” illustrating it with examples such as when an official requests, accepts or lobby for a bribe in a bid to “circumvent public policies and processes for competitive advantage and profit” (World Bank, 1997:9). Invariably, for the Bank, as long as public office is used for personal gain the cause of corruption is served. One of the unmistaken gaps in the above definition is that corruption transcends the use of public resources for private benefit.

In other words, it goes beyond soliciting, giving or taking of bribe to also occurs when the system is malfunctioning and the vast majority of citizens are left to fend for themselves by incurring unnecessary costs to gain access to otherwise free or subsidised public good. Beyond understanding it in terms of the use of public office for private gain (Hulter and Shah, 2000), corruption represents some form of degeneration from what is or should be normal (Okojie and Momoh, 2005: 1). To rely on Rogstow and Lasswell (1963: 132) that corruption deals with the “violation of public interest” therefore lack clarity and focus. The notion of “public interest,” just like public opinion, is heavily contested for the most part. In order words, what constitutes public interest is elastic in that it tends to vary from one context or circumstances to another depending on the types of publics; general, informed, elitist publics.

It cannot always be assumed that the elements within such multiple sites share convergence of interests; not just on corruption but also the pathways to nation building. Invariably, then, if corruption is understood to be the violation of public interest scholarship has still not resolved what constitute the ‘public’ at this time.In the final analysis, any definition of corruption that puts the public interest at the heart of the debate on corruption would be necessary but not sufficient to addressing the underlying causes of corruption. To summary, therefore, corruption in the context of this dissertation will include- but not be limited to asking, giving or taking a free gift or favour in exchange for the performance of a legitimate task; the pervasion or obstruction of the performance of such a task or the performance of an illegal and illegitimate task such as hoarding, collusion, price fixing; election rigging as well as the abuse (or misuse) of office (Uji, 2015:9). It could also mean, according to Li and his collaborators (2011:116), the “non-public use of public power (abuse and unfair exchange).” Unlike most other definitions that focus on the involvement of government officials exercising abuse of power, Li and associates (2011) proposed a wider scope which includes motivation (purpose), means, mechanism and their negative consequences. For them, whereas, abuse of power is at the heart of corruption a lot of corruption is out of public view, hidden under the cloak of abuse of power with violation of established codes of ethics of acceptable conduct.

According to Nye (1967), corruption is “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private gain.” This suggests that corruption is significant precisely because it draws attention to attitude towards a formal duty while amplifying the point that the aim of corruption is to achieve an advantage through illegal means. It also refer to “efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means – private gain at public expense; or a misuse of public power for private benefit” (Lipset ; Lenz, 2000). The latter definitions see corruption from the viewpoint of wealth amassing and wealth accumulation but fails to explain why even rich political and economic elites have elevated corruption to a way of life driven by greed. This is corroborated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) which concludes that corruption involves the behaviour of public and private officers who improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves and/or those closely related to them, or induce others to do so, by misusing the position in which they are placed. To Agbu (2001), corruption occurs when an inducement (in cash or in kind) is taken or given in a relationship. Such might include (but are not limited to) kickbacks, pay-off, sweeteners or greasing-the-palm) on a large or small scale. It generally tends to occur when a service is sought from government officials thereby excluding transactions that involve individualising private capacities. Corruption is apparent whenever authorised persons negate the expected purposes of the organizations; forcing clients and other service users to follow otherwise unacceptable path ways while punishing those who resist and try to live up to the formal norms.At another level, Transparency International (2002) defined corruption as “an inappropriate or illegal behaviour of the public sector official (politician or public officer) by misusing the entrusted power for private gain of the person or related people. This definition limits its scope to those who wield power, thereby forgetting the corruption that occurs within the wider society or out of connivance between those in power and those outside. By focusing only on public office holders to the neglect of other actors or elements within the society, scholars miss the opportunity to account for miscellaneous crimes such as pick-pocketing, internet fraud, identity theft, check dulling, etc. TI (2002) further explains that corruption is “usually an activity that is outside of constitutional government process, which involves the sale of publicly produced goods and services by government employees for payment or bribes not sanctioned by the government”. This further narrows the scope of this definition to political type of corruption in Nigeria. It does not explain other forms of corruption rampant in many societies today that hardly have anything to do with government employees or involve government business transactions.There is a sense in which understanding corruption as an illegal (and unconstitutional) activity could help to sharpen recognition of it and in tackling the phenomenon In this regard, corruption could either occur when a person invoked with constitutional power uses it directly or by proxy in an unconstitutional way. It was in this particular sense that Khan (1996: 45) defines corruption as an “act which deviates from the formal rules of conduct governing the actions of someone in a position of public authority because of private regarding motive such as wealth, power or status.” In this regard, also, “corruption is the perversion of integrity or state of affairs through bribery, favour or moral depravity” … It takes place when at least two parties are engaged in transactions, illicit or open, that changes the structure or processes of society or the behaviour of functionaries in order to produce dishonest, unfaithful or defiled situations (Khan, 1996: 45).This implies that corruption is mostly an illegal act characterised by “favouritism, nepotism, tribalism, sectionalism, undue enrichment, amassing of wealth, abuse of office, power, position and derivation of undue gains and benefits”. Understood in these ways, also, corruption also includes “bribery, smuggling, fraud, illegal payments, money laundering, drug trafficking, falsification of documents and records, window dressing, false declaration, evasion, underpayment, deceit, forgery, concealment, aiding and abetting of any kind to the detriment of another person, community, society or nation.” (Khan, 1996)The Oxford Advance Learners Dictionary describes corruption as “an act or effect of making somebody change from moral to immoral standards of behaviour” by them into doing something immoral by offering a payback in return. This definition has been criticised not only because it is difficult to talk of dishonesty and illegality except there is a person or group which sets the standard but also due to the issue around measurability. Such concept as dishonesty is laden with value judgement that varies from one context to another. This raises the need to understand the standard of morality in Nigeria as the first critical step towards addressing the menace of corruption and finding lasting solutions to eradicate. Invariably, if the benchmark is set by politicians are themselves labelled as corrupt, their location within the society would determine how they see and react to the phenomenon. In other words, a “corrupt” person could be “saintly”, invited to go and sin no more, if he/she belongs to the ruling party, and vice versa. According to Otite (2004:12), the history of corruption in Nigeria is traceable to how 29 years of post-independence military rule brought corruption to the front burner within the public space. Today, the rate of corruption is not only alarming but constitute a substantial drain in human and material resources (Otite, 2004) but this is not an in-depth narrative of the genesis of corruption in Nigeria. The genesis of corruption in Nigeria can be mapped to the pre-colonial era, and as Davidson noted, the Afro-European conversations created by the British during the pre-colonial eras were based on falsehood and deceit (1960: 85). As he understood it, the colonial empire was an empire of scam and fraud, especially given how it utilised the carrot-and-stick approach to manipulate the system (Anene and Brown, 1966). This point was reiterated by Alagoa (1980) showing how colonies and protectorates were established were dishonestly and unjustifiably obtained. It was clear to him that in some places, they had offered “protection”, sealed in questionable “protectorate treaties.” that turned out to be outright scamming of local chiefs to let off their kingdoms without knowing it. King Jaja of Opobo is one of those that paid dearly for the excesses of European commercial and consular interests for questioning the meaning of “protectorate.”, The above trend sooner became a part of the Nigerian society even till date. For Storey (1953) there had been long-drawn cases of abuse of public offices with accusations of widespread corruption as far back as during the First Republic. It was, to a large extent, for this reason that the first military coup by a group of young military officers occurred on 15th January 1966 (Nzeogwu, 1966). It is important to reflect on the genealogy of corruption as documented in Chinua Achebe’s seminal book on The Trouble with Nigeria (YEAR). In it, he argued that since the discovery of oil in 1956 corruption has increased at a fast pace. Although Nigeria is one of the largest oil producing nations in the world, the country remains far less developed compared to its peers due to widespread corruption. To illustrate this endemic nature of corruption in Nigeria, Achebe drew the analogy that keeping an average Nigeria from being corrupt is like preventing a goat from eating yam (Achebe, 1988).Following the discovery of oil in commercial quantities and the huge foreign exchange earnings from it, successive administrations in Nigeria have grown greedier and steeped in corruption when it comes to the allocation of public funds and awarding of contracts in ways that stagnates growth and development, and in the end, replicate crass materialism. Transparency International estimated that corruption accounts for 20 percent of the GDP of Nigeria. For several years Nigeria has been at the bottom of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranking of the international anti-corruption body (Transparency International, 2008). It is important to note that the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Establishment Act 2004 broadened the definition of corruption when it authorizes the Commission to investigate, prevent, and prosecute offenders who engage in Money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, illegal oil bunkering, illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic, wastes, and prohibited goods. (EFCC, 2004: A18)From this perspective, corruption may therefore be categorised into three main forms: incidental (individual), institutional (like the police institution), and systemic (societal). The first form of corruption is confined to instances of malfeasance on the part of individual politicians or public officials, and such tends to be episodic rather than systemic. This can be found in most countries and only in few instances do they pose any. In other cases, corruption may be pronounced in particular institutions or sectors than others, reflecting differential access, opportunities and controls. In the third case, systemic or endemic, “corruption pervades the entire society and in the process becomes routinised and accepted as a means of conducting everyday transactions” at the private and institutional levels (Robinson, 1998:3). This last type of corruption has a number of important features that are central to the discourse and analysis privileged in this dissertation:i. It is embedded in specific socio-cultural environments.ii. It tends to be monopolistic, organized and difficult to avoid; andiii. It features prominently in societies characterized by low political competition, low and uneven economic growth, a weak civil society and the absence of institutional mechanisms to deal with corruption (Robinson, 1998).The UNDP partly draws attention to the institutional dimensions of corruption, insisting that corruption emanates when public officials are entrusted with broad scope of authority, little accountability and perverse incentives, or when there is no accountability for discretionary power wielded by the public officials or when their accountability answers to an informal rather than a formal form of regulation (UNDP:9) This implies that corruption arises from the failure of the institutions of states to ensure accountability through social, financial, legal and political framework which should have served as a check and balance for the state and the society. In essence, the breeding ground for corruption is located in the context where public officials wield somewhat monopoly of power in the absence of any framework for checks and balances or accountability.According to Roberts (1988) a veritable modelling of how corruption takes place must include the combination of monopoly of power, discretion and absence of accountability is a catalyst for corruption. He postulates that corruption takes place when it meets the conditions of the following formula: C = (M + D – A) where C stands for Corruption; M for Management, D and A for Discretion and Accountability, respectively. In this formula, the opportunity for corruption to take place (C) is a function of the monopoly of power given to a public official (M), the discretion the public official has in dispensing the power given to him (D) and the accountability that the public official faces in making decisions (A). The reality, of course, is that this model may only be suitable for explaining institutional corruption whereas the major determinants of corruption are far more complex and complicated beyond them (Kaufmann and Jeffrey Sachs, 1997). The Roberts model was modified by (UNDP, 2004) by adding variables such as Integrity and Transparency. In the new schema, the equation would be: C=(M+D)-(A+I+T) where C is Corruption, M is Monopoly of Power, D is discretion, A is accountability, I is integrity and T is Transparency. This implies that corruption takes place when there is an acute absence of Integrity, Transparency and Accountability besides monopoly of power and discretion. Yet, both formulas are true to an extent but could also be misleading. Firstly, reducing monopoly does not necessarily lessen corruption given that even competition in itself can also encourage corruption. For example, public officials can compete to offer the most attractive packages in order to have an upper edge. A very good example of this is when government engage in privatisation. On the issue of discretion, Robert’s formula fails to take into consideration that corruption also occurs when public officials are given lesser discretion. Indeed, discretion in itself is advantageous in public decision-making as it allows public officials to tailor decisions to suit changing circumstances and situation thereby leading to increase in efficiency and speed in action. Finally, a gap in the perspective offered by Roberts and others in his genre is that the formula only provides the symptoms of corruption rather than solution to the problem of corruption. This, in effect, makes the formula or whatever utility derivable from it virtually irrelevant to the fight against corruption. This work will be focused on the institutional form of corruption. Institutional corruption is occurs when there is a systemic and strategic influence which is legal, or even currently ethical, that undermines the institutions effectiveness by diverting it from its purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including, to the extent relevant to its purpose, weakening either the public trust in that institution or the institutions inherent trustworthiness (Lessig, 2013: 2).2.3 Theoretical FrameworkThis work adopts constructivism as the theoretical framework. The constructivist approach focuses on the inter-subjective nature of the international system in ways that place considerable premium on ideas, norms, the development of structures, the relationship between actors and structures and how identity influences actions and behaviours amongst and between actors as well as how norms shape the character of an actor (Reus-Smit, 2005). To put it differently, the constructivists present a counter-narrative about how states behave in a patently anarchical international system and disagree with the realist school that anarchy inescapably leads to competition and war. In the words of Wendt (1992: 394):Self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure. There is no logic of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structures have no existence or causal powers apart from process. By way of emphasis, then, some of the major assumptions of the constructivists as developed by Schmitz (2008) are as follows:i. States, inter-governmental organisations(IGOs), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are actors in global affairs;ii. The international system is characterised by the rule of norms. This means that identities, norms and culture play an important role in world politicsiii. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) play an important role in spreading norms and teaching states; andiv. States are subject to norms and IGOs/NGO pressures; hence, their self-interest is not the primary mover of global affairs.There is no doubt that the world has witnessed a geometrical proliferation of non-state actors since the end of the Cold War. These actors increasingly shape, spread and legitimise norms and ideas in the international system, including those related to the emergence of anti-corruption regimes such as UNCAC. Because the constructivist theory is not entirely focused on states (Hurd, 2008), it is possible in the context of the present study to identify and study other actors that fight against corruption asides state actors. This is fundamental to explaining the role UNCAC plays in the fight against corruption.Clearly, the fight against corruption was not a major global agenda prior to the 1990s. The absence of any serious international framework for fighting corruption was such that the international community turned a blind eye to its debilitating effects on socio-economic and political development of many African countries, including in Nigeria. Although there were anti-corruption campaigns in several countries, they attracted little or no attention from the international community that essentially considered them sovereign issues that should be left to individual countries to manage and mitigate. Even though countries like the United States made efforts to bring the issue of corruption to the front burner of international agenda, such initiative only gained slow and minuscule traction globally. Since the turn of the 21st century, however, the world has witnessed a shift in the attitude of the international community towards corruption and anti-corruption issues. Since then, for instance, a number of anti-corruption coalitions, institutions and cooperation have emerged; most notably Transparency International (TI), African Union Convention against Bribery and Corruption (AUCBC) and the UNCAC. By the close of the 1990s, the international community had virtually come to terms with the fact that there is a clear nexus between corruption, bad governance and the pauperisation of citizens in many countries in the Global South (Galtung and Pope, 1999).The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, UNCAC, came into existence at the critical juncture of the fledgling global movement to fight corruption. Today, it stands as a landmark achievement in the international fight against corruption; and a product of the accelerated consciousness of the multiplier threats that corruption poses to sustainable growth and development in many countries. Further, it is an acknowledgement that the fight against corruption cannot be left in the hands of any one single country alone but through the concerted efforts of several. The international community saw the need for a synergy not only at the national level but also acting globally. It was against these myriad backdrops that a robust international response to the threat of corruption through the UNCAC was mobilised with the aim of establishing global anticorruption standards and obligations (Webb, 2005).Although issues like the facilitation of tracing, freezing, forfeiting and returning of stolen public assets continues to be a challenge despite the adoption of the UNCAC provisions, that signatory countries go as far as adapting its provisions to national laws and practices is a milestone. At least, the Convention makes provision for technical support in the bid to help states comply with the provisions of the UNCAC. These technical supports include provisions on training, material and human resources, research, and information sharing. 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New York: Oxford Press Limited.CHAPTER THREEMETHODOLOGY3.1 IntroductionThe aim of this chapter is to describe the methods and procedures that will be employed in carrying out this study. This, in specific terms, include providing a description of the research method, the sources and methods of data collection, the population and sample size used, and a description of the method of data presentation and analysis.3.2 Research Design/TypeThis study will rely on qualitative data derived from the adoption of descriptive survey type of design in which interviews will be conducted with selected respondents. The choice of this method is informed by the need to be able to gather enough and balanced information for the study, which may not be feasible with other research methods. In this regard, the study will rely on the administration of structured interview questions in order to reflect the problems and objectives of the study. The interview guide will contain open-ended questions. This is in a bid to ensure adequate responses to the interview questions provided. 3.3 Sources and Methods of Data CollectionThis study will employ both primary and secondary data. The primary data will be extracted through in-depth interviews with a spectrum of respondents across Nigeria. The use of interview method by the researcher is justified by the notion of independent opinion expression. This method allows for the collection of tangible information and data from the respondents. Each of the respondents will be interviewed separately based on booked appointment with each of them scheduled at various times and date that will be convenient for each respondent. The proposed structured interview will elicit answers to the following key questions (1) what is your perception on corruption in Nigeria? (2) Why is it that despite significant progress on anti-corruption, corruption remains a major challenge in Nigeria? (3) In your opinion, has the UNCAC’s provisions been able to have a noticeable impact on Nigeria’s fight against corruption? (4) Can corruption be prevented through a global platform like UNCAC? (5) Do you think that the provisions of UNCAC’s provisions can provide an opportunity to address the issue of corruption in Nigeria? (6) What are the challenges UNCAC faces in its efforts to curb corruption in Nigeria? (7) What are the areas the UNCAC need to address in its bid to help Nigeria fight corruption, and (8) Has Nigeria been able to effectively incorporate the provisions of UNCAC since its ratification?The expectation is that in-depth interviews will provide the needed insight into issues central to understanding the political economy of anti-corruption initiative in Nigeria, and how UNCAC have become domesticated and applied in Nigeria. Further, in-depth interview will help to consolidate the paucity of data and information currently in the public domain as well as allow the research to ask follow-up questions for clarification and elaboration. Asides the aforementioned, interviews are useful because they enable for a deeper analysis of attitudes, experiences and opinion of the targeted respondents and at the same time giving room for feedback to the questions. The result of the interviews are analysed and reported with respect to the common themes that emerged, as well as insights gained from specific individuals, Finally, secondary data will be obtained from textbooks, newspapers, journals and magazines, official publications, and the Internet.3.4 Population of the StudyThe target population consists of 15 senior staffs of the major anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria: the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), as well as those drawn from the Nigerian Judiciary (Serving and retired Judges and Lawyers), Nigerian Police (Serving and Retired), Nigerian Army, and the Nigerian Media. The inclusion of the senior staffs of major anti-corruption agencies in the study population is because they are directly involved in the fight against corruption and are in the best position to provide information on issues affecting, for good or bad, the anti-corruption campaign in Nigeria. Other respondents are drawn from academics circles and opinion leaders. The reason for the inclusion of the aforementioned is because of their vast knowledge on the issue of corruption in Nigeria and the provisions of the UNCAC. They are also in the best position to understand these issues based on their educational background, position and experiences.3.5 Method of Data Presentation and AnalysisThe data generated will be transcribed and summarised using tables while descriptive method will be employed to analyse them. This method of analysis will involve triangulation such that data and information generated from multiple sources are managed and presented in a coherent and empirically-informed manner.